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Abstract
An important philosopher and anthropologist of science, Bruno Latour has recently outlined an 
ambitious programme for a new sociological empiricism, in continuation of his actor-network-
theory (ANT). Interrogating issues of description, explanation and theoretical interpretation in 
this ‘sociology of associations’, we argue that certain internal tensions are manifest. While 
Latour’s philosophy of social science demands an absolute abandonment of theory in all its 
forms, proposing instead to simply ‘go on describing’, he is in practice employing versions 
of common sense explanation and pragmatic-constructivist theory to make ends meet.The 
core of this tension, we claim, can be located in Latour’s meta-theoretical commitments, 
in effect obscuring important ways in which human subjects employ things, effects and 
symbols beyond their simple, ‘empirical’ existence. To illustrate these claims, we deploy 
the example of how morality works in social life, and coin the term quasi-actant, in allusion 
to the Latourian actant, to better understand such processes. Our overall criticism of ANT is 
immanent, aiming at the re-introduction of what we dub ‘virtual theory’ into Latourian 
empiricism, thus further strengthening what remains one of the most promising contemporary 
attempts to reinvigorate the sociological enterprise.
1. Introduction: Latour between radical descriptivism and
empirical obscurity
In his recent book-length introduction to Actor-Network Theory (ANT) –
Reassembling the Social (2005) – French philosopher and anthropologist of
science, Bruno Latour, has given his thinking a distinctly sociological bend. He
now aligns his well-known analyses of sciences and technologies (eg Latour,
1988a; 1996a) with a general sociological programme, dubbed the ‘sociology of
associations’, to distinguish it from the tradition of the ‘sociology of the social’
running from Durkheim through to Giddens, Habermas, and Bourdieu. Soci-
ologists of the social, Latour want us to realize, mistakenly sought to explain
the social by society: some social stuff (power, capital, norms) explains other
social stuff (behaviours, practices, institutions). According to Latour, this is
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all wrong: society explains nothing but must itself be explained. Or rather,
employing case studies and narratives of particular events, social life must be
carefully described in its concrete details (Latour, 2000). Latour, we note, is
at the forefront of a new descriptive turn in sociology, raising fundamental
challenges to the methods, theories, and public authority of the discipline
(see Savage, 2009).
Revisiting the social with Latour leads to a complete redirection of sociol-
ogy. All the well-known structures of society are suddenly no-where to be
found; instead, we now find concrete relations of humans and non-humans
acting together. Over here is the man-computer-spreadsheet-office hybrid that
we used to call ‘bureaucratic rationalism’; over there is the vibrating man-virus-
laboratory relation that we used to call ‘scientific fact’, and so on. Sociology of
associations entails a change of focus from ‘society’ (of humans) to ‘collectives’
(of humans and non-humans).And, symmetrically, its method changes as well:
from theoretically interpreting human actions to obstinately ‘following the
actor’ by tracking and mapping its multiple associations. Explanations, Latour
stresses, are only for lazy sociologists, who want to jump straight to the ‘big
picture’ without paying the price. This is why Latour is dead serious when he
states (2005:146) that ‘the name of the game is to get back to empiricism’.While
distinguishing his second empiricism of shape-shifting techno-scientific objects
from the first empiricism of Locke and onwards, this only makes the task of
description more laborious than anticipated. Latour’s ideal remains one of
descriptivist empiricism, indeed of a self-confessedly radical type: ‘just go on
describing’ seems to be his new master-rule of sociological method (see Latour,
2005: 110ff).
In this article,we want to engage in a critical,but fundamentally sympathetic,
dialogue on Bruno Latour’s empiricist take on sociological method, looking
in particular at his version of the description-explanation-interpretation triad.
Our engagement takes the new, hybrid relations between subjects and objects
as its starting point. Put briefly, we fully agree to Latour’s reworking of the
(former) object-pole: if anything, Latour should be credited with turning
objects as ‘matters-of-fact’ into uncertain and disputed ‘matters-of-concern’
(Latour, 1996a; 2000; 2002). Instead, our basic issue with Latour’s sociological
empiricism has to do with the (former) subject-pole: is the new quasi-subject
really so constituted, we want to ask, as to lend itself to full description? Will
not something crucial be lost in our view of inter-subjective social life if we
just ‘go on describing’? As we aim to show, raising these classic-sounding
questions in relation to Latour will allow us to explore some less-frequently
travelled paths for a more general renewal of sociological methodology.
To be specific, we are not seeking here to defend some version of the
sociology of the social, nor some version of ‘social constructivism’, both con-
sistently and convincingly criticised by Latour (eg 2000; 2005). Instead, we are
engaging in immanent critique. In other words, while the stance we develop
opens up a space for more theoretical interpretation than allowed for by ANT
descriptivism, it is still, we believe, in full accordance with Latourian principles,
which it complements and strengthens. In this sense, we think of ourselves
as reconstructing, not deconstructing, ANT. Needless to say, raising questions
of descriptivism and inter-subjectivity in relation to Bruno Latour is difficult,
since part of his metaphysical programme consists exactly in denying the
independence of what-was-formerly-known-as ‘the subjective’ and ‘the social’.
Latour’s is really a theory of ‘inter-objectivity’, not of inter-subjectivity
(see Latour, 1996b). Unsurprisingly, this has given rise to criticisms: humanists
(and Marxists) worry about the ‘generalized symmetry’ of humans and non-
humans (eg Vandenberghe, 2002), while critical realists worry about the con-
sequent collapse of the ‘stratified ontology’ separating the level of actors
and the level of structures (eg Elder-Vass, 2008). These criticisms of ANT
are to be expected, but they bear little resemblance to the methodological
commitments we champion in this article.
Rather, our concerns start from the suspicion that Latour may not be
symmetrical enough in his dealings with (quasi-) objects and subjects, paying
much more attention to the former than the latter. Partly, this flaw can be
traced genealogically in ANT: this theory has always been more concerned
with redistributing our notions of objectivity, particularly in the techno-
scientific realm, than with re-assembling subjectivity (eg Latour, 1987). What
concerns us, then, is whether such ‘bias’ is acceptable, given the extension of
ANT into a general sociology of associations? And if not, how methodological
reconstruction can be achieved, while staying true to the basic framework of
Latour’s social ontology? To frame this discussion, Latour’s concepts of
folding and working will constitute our point of departure, allowing us to get
to the crux of what is problematic in his radical descriptivism. Hidden in these
concepts, we want to argue, is a certain meta-methodological problem, having
to do with the ways in which Latour seems to be ‘heterogenizing’ human
actants in lieu of stabilizing non-humans.
Our own suggestions can be seen as part of a larger ‘metaphysics of the
social’, which stresses the crucial issue of empirical obscurity, as opposed to the
difficulties which Latour already acknowledges. Empirical obscurity, we will
argue, constitutes the basis on which certain forms of theory – which we end up
calling ‘virtual theory’ – are much more essential to the practice of sociological
inquiry than Latour seems to explicitly acknowledge. In this attempt to
sharpen ANT methodology, without relapsing into sociology of the social, we
will introduce the concept of quasi-actants, developed as an alternative (or a
supplement) to Latour’s notion of black-boxes. This distinction is symmetrical
to that of empirical obscurity and difficulty: Latour’s black-boxes constitute
tightly packed piles of relations (eg IBM as a black-box of actant-networks),
which can nonetheless potentially be ‘(re-)opened’ for full description. Quasi-
actants, on the contrary, ‘erase their traces’ as they work on the social, making
full description impossible due to empirical obscurity.
Throughout the article, issues of morality (broadly understood) will func-
tion as our main ‘empirical’ reference point, anchoring the methodological
reflections. In this respect, we do not wish to enter into specifically moral
theorizing, various philosophical approaches to morality, an exploration of the
normative aspects of ANT, or anything of the like.We simply cling on to moral
convictions as an important embodiment of something traditionally under-
stood to involve human subjectivity, inter-subjective understandings, and so
on. Moral convictions, we might argue, constitute a ‘hard case’ for Latour’s
sociology of associations, since his radical descriptivism will have to engage
some rather ephemeral and intangible phenomena. Further, focusing on
morality allows us to ‘follow Latour himself’, in that he has explicitly reflected
on this topic in relation to his philosophy of technology on several occasions
(1992; 1999; 2002). Following this path will allow us to position quasi-actants
and virtual theory as important ingredients of a reconstructed ANT landscape
– a landscape which, once reassembled, will provide fertile ground for the
future invigoration of sociology.1
2. Fold, work, and description in Latour’s social metaphysics
Taking the article on Morality andTechnology:The End of the Means (2002) as
a point of departure, we encounter one of the more consistent expositions of
the concept of the fold in Latour’s work.2 Folding, in Latour’s usage, denotes
a type of acting that produces socio-technical relations, through the connecting
(in a network-relational sense) of one place and time with another that it
would otherwise not have been connected to (Latour, 2002: 251; see also
Latour, 1996b: 239). As such, any technology, or socio-technical hybrid, can be
seen as accumulations of folds, of layers and compilations, of detours and
re-orderings. Latour gives the straightforward example of a hammer, which
folds into it a number of different temporalities: ore from the birth of the
universe, wood that goes back a hundred years or so, and the factory producing
the hammer ten years ago. The same goes for places as well: the hammer
connects such spatially distant places as South-American forests, German
mines, the tools department of the store etc., locations that would never have
been connected outside of this particular technology (Latour, 2002).
According to Latour, this is exactly the characteristic of technology: it
reworks, or folds, differences in space, time, and agency in new ways, creating
new associations, and hence new patterns of social relations. This is what, in
Reassembling the Social (Latour, 2005), is called ‘work of mediation’, that is,
the work of crafting new actants, new hybrids, and new events. A mediator, in
Latour’s parlance, is the opposite of an ‘intermediary’, something which simply
transports the action of other entities, as implied for instance by notions of a
hammer as a ‘mere tool’. Nothing, in Latour’s social ontology, is ever a ‘mere
tool’: the hammer always modifies the intentions and goals of its human
co-actant.Action, in short, is ‘not a property of humans but of an association of
actants’ (Latour, 1999: 182; emphasis in original). Implicit in this is Latour’s
version of anti-reductionism, which replaces the idea of causal reduction with
what (using a Foucauldian expression) could be called ‘causal multiplication’
(see Olssen, 2008). In methodological ANT terms, causal multiplication is
achieved by following, and hence unravelling, all the connections folded into
an object – that is, by unfolding it. If we think of the hammer (or any other
technology) as a black-box, folding is equivalent to the work of black-boxing
(see Latour, 1999: 183f); while unfolding corresponds to the well-known ANT
slogan of ‘opening the black-box’, that is, re-describing it in detail. The crucial
point is that, to Latour, while this re-description may be difficult, it should be
possible in principle.
Now, having established some conceptual premises, we get to a crucial point
of Latour’s work on morality and technology: his language of hybrids does not
only concern acts traditionally viewed as ‘object-centred’, such as hammering
in a nail, but is to be applied equally for acts traditionally viewed as moral or
social. To use one of Latour’s own famous examples, in the US context of
conspicuous rates of hand weapon killings, it is neither ‘guns’ nor ‘people’ that
‘kill people’, but rather the hybrid ‘citizen-gun’ (see Latour, 1999: 176ff). Many
sociologists, no doubt, would start searching for ‘cultural’ explanations here,
thus missing the obvious role played by the availability of guns and their
person-transforming capabilities. When, in Reassembling the Social (2005:
205ff), Latour talks of the ‘circulation of subjectifiers’, it is precisely this effect
of (what used to be called) objects on (what used to be called) subjects he is
aiming at. For this reason, morality is not something that can be reserved
for human ends alone – indeed, no fundamental subject-object divide can
be maintained (see, eg, Latour, 1999). Instead, Latour pushes a strong ‘non-
humanism’ by arguing that ‘without technological detour, the properly human
cannot exist’ (2002: 252). In this, rather than reducing subjects to the being of
objects, Latour seems to be granting objects the becoming of subjects: the
constant process of entering into new associations.3
However, this is exactly where our suspicion of asymmetry in Latour’s
methodology kicks in because, although he attempts to dissolve the subject-
object divide into generalized symmetry, and although he hybridizes morality
and technology, he seems one-sidedly interested in the object folds and fold-
ings of society. In other words, he seems to have curiously little to say on how
human moral convictions fold (quasi)-objects, that is, on subject folds and
foldings (of itself, of other subjects, and of quasi-objects). Indeed, Latour
defines human sociality in general by its ability to fold, or hybridize, itself into
things, claiming that ‘any time an interaction has temporal and spatial exten-
sion [ie is folded], it is because one has shared it with non-humans’ (Latour,
1996b: 239; also Strum and Latour, 1987). Furthermore, as mentioned, Latour
entertains the notion of dissolving the subject into circulations of subjectifiers;
that is, of dissolving subjectivity into (quasi)-objectivity, not the inverse way
around (Latour, 2005). What was supposed to be an object-subject-hybrid
thus tends toward a different line of reasoning: the subject as object-object-
hybrids. This is a tricky point, because in one sense Latour is right: also things
contain morality, because human and non-human actants are inextricably
bound up together. Consequently, our argument with Latour can be put
non-aggressively, by simply noting that compared to the folding of non-
humans, Latour has little to say on human folds, including what consequences
such foldings have for sociological methodology.4 In a nutshell, while on the
one hand dissolving the subject-object divide into hybrids, Latour seems on
the other to be heterogenizing the (former) subject on behalf of the (former)
object (see also Law, 2002). Or, put differently: to ground human folds in the
folding of things.
On this point, we find it difficult to follow Latour. Moral convictions can
hardly be described as mediated (in the Latourian sense) by technological
things alone. To be fair, Latour does seem to acknowledge this point, stating
that ‘obviously, a person is not constituted solely in the act of grasping a tool’
(2002: 253). Further, as if stating what is only common sense,5 he goes on to say
that ‘of course, the moral law is in our hearts, but it is also in our apparatuses’
(ibid.: 253). The problem is that Latour says very little about this ‘heart’, in
which morality is presumably enfolded. Now, on whichever ontology we adopt,
it seems persuasive to suggest that bodies (with its hearts, brains, and so on)
contribute to morality, that they transports moral convictions from one place-
time to another as a more-or-less (un-)conscious memory (see Watson, 1998).6
Further, it seems reasonable to describe this human body-work as indeed a
work of folding: our bodies fold moral ‘choices’ in the here-and-now, as up
against childhood events, inter-personal relations, yesterdays’ TV-shows, and
so on – in quite the same way as do material objects. The implication of such
an argument for sociological methodology, and particularly for the ability to
fully describe such associations, is exactly what is at stake in our concept of
the quasi-actant.
To explore these methodological consequences, however, we need first to
look more closely at Latour’s philosophy of science, in terms of how social
science works in a performative sense. In his article on The Politics of Expla-
nation (1988b), Latour distinguishes two fundamentally different ways of
relating phenomena, A and B, in scientific practice. In the standard approach,
A is used to correlate, predict, or comment on B; in the second approach, this
very work of abolishing explanatory distance is itself taken as object, thus
displaying the extended scientific work of making up explanations. To take an
example, Latour’s interest in statistics would have more to do with how
statisticians work to dissolve, say, the empirical distance between education
and income – by using questionnaires, indexes, constructing variables, and so
on – than with the statistical relation between the two phenomena as such.
Empirically, education is not ‘like’ income, but statistics works on both – eg by
representing them in numbers – thereby making the latter predictable from
the former. Statistics thus abolishes distance through a kind of interpretation,
but by describing the work of the statisticians, the same distance can be
fully displayed, unfolding the many translations. This is the sense in which
Latour wants to move from explanation to description: from explanations of
action-at-a-distance (eg how education influences income) to descriptions of
work through mediators (eg statistical representations and other ‘inscription
devices’).7 Indeed, failing to pay attention to mediators and instead inventing
‘hidden’ hyper-causes, modern-day sociologists, according to Latour, problem-
atically create and maintain their ‘Great Divides’ between action and struc-
ture, micro and macro, cause and effect (Latour, 2005; see van Krieken, 2002;
Schinkel, 2007).8
To sum up, by exploring this notion of social science as performative work,
we can now clarify Latour’s position on the issue of explanation versus
description: in his new politics of sociological method, the former is simply to
be dissolved into the latter. Work, in the Latourian methodological sense, is to
create and display the folded (and often black-boxed) relations which make
something ‘explainable’ by something else. The example of morality can now
be resumed, because moral convictions too, just like statistics, on the one hand
reduces, translates, and interprets situations. Robbery, for instance, is trans-
lated into an offence against justice, perhaps against the law of property,
demanding imprisonment. In short, moral convictions work, in the Latourian
sense. On the other hand, morality is itself a folded phenomenon: as argued,
it is embedded in networks of bodies, institutions, and things.9 Here, however,
our methodological concern re-emerges. Whenever moral convictions, in
analogy with the hammer, ‘does something’ in a given situation, it satisfies the
Latourian definition of an actant. But can the foldings and workings of moral
convictions be pursued, traced, mapped, in just the same way as that of the
hammer? We might assume that moral life is not only more difficult to
describe, as Latour would have it, but that it is constitutively obscure in its
workings. Morality, we want to argue, ‘erases its traces’; and, by analogy, so too
does other intangible social phenomena like affects and beliefs.
In exploring how this claim forces us to rethink the Latourian position on
description and explanation, let us first visit a related set of issues. Perhaps our
reading of Latour so far has been too literal: perhaps Latour relies to a far
greater extent than we have allowed for on ‘common sense’, and hence on the
adequacy of common sense explanation? In the next section, we argue that
indeed he does – only to continue by pointing to some of the unsafe footings
of common sense.
3. Common sense explanation: Latour’s unsafe ally
The argument so far is that Latour attempts to abolish theoretical explana-
tions into descriptions of folding work. This position, however, can be further
elaborated, by noting that Latour does not quite seem ready to abandon
theory altogether: with ANT, he notes (2005: 220f), theory is ‘a negative, empty,
relativistic grid that allows us not to synthesize the ingredients of the social in
the actors place’. While minimalist, Latour’s ‘relativistic grid’ of theory may
here be taken as his attempt to confront the circularity of the description-
explanation conundrum. More precisely, Latour seems to implicitly be strug-
gling with the familiar claim that theoretical interpretation is, in principle, the
fundamental condition for description, since social effects can never be per-
ceived directly – only states of affairs can. For example, ‘I will not learn from
a No Smoking sign why some people obey it while many others ignore it’
(Collins and Yearley, 1992: 318).10 Observing that fewer people smoke in
rooms with No-Smoking signs than in ones without would be a simple state-
ment of facts; we never really see the chain of effective associations.The crucial
point is that an effect, such as that of a No Smoking sign, not only cannot be
established from the actant alone (as Collins and Yearley note), but neither
from the actant and its surroundings taken together! Ultimately, the unfolding
of social effects – or, in Latourian parlance, of chains of eventful mediation –
is a question of interpretive explanations that can only be rendered probable
by description. In social science practice, there is neither pure explanation nor
pure description, only various ‘hybrids’ in-between.
This, however, is not how Latour positions his methodological attempt to
dissolve the ‘modernist’ ontology of causes and effects into fully describable
chains of mediation. Rather, in his own investigations, he manoeuvres by
invoking a kind of (reconstructed) common sense thinking.11 In most familiar,
taken-for-granted contexts, descriptions can be made sufficiently detailed as to
contain the necessary elements of explanation and interpretation within the
limits of conventional reasonableness. Quite commonly, such description will
take the shape of a ‘followable’ narrative, given that narration is the syntax
of common sense explanation (Abbott, 2004: 33). Against this background, it
comes as little surprise that Latour prefers a sociology of ‘small histories’
to one of grand abstractions (see Latour, 1996a); nor that his work on
the transportation system Aramis adopts the stylistic genre of a detective
story (see Austrin and Farnsworth, 2005). In various types of familiar settings
– including familiar genres of narrative – further explicating the elements of
‘theoretical’ interpretation would quickly become banal. Here, it is worth
noting that such everyday settings, filled with culturally coded and thus ‘unno-
ticeable’ interpretive procedures, was exactly what constituted the starting
point of Garfinkel’s ethno-methodological programme (see Bertilsson, 2004:
378); and that Latour is, in many ways, an explicit heir to Garfinkel’s study of
the common-sensual practices of actors in a variety of taken-for-granted social
contexts (Garfinkel: the home; Latour: the laboratory). Where they differ,
however, is on the question of method: Garfinkel thought that social codes
could only be made visible (ie described) by deliberately breaching them;
Latour, on the other hand, is content to simply ‘follow the actors’, seemingly
believing that social codes are there on the surface, to be described directly.
The problem of description-versus-explanation does not, however, disap-
pear this easily; in fact, it routinely sneaks back into Latour’s own writings,
albeit in ways unacknowledged by him. To make this point clearer, let us look
briefly at another of Latour’s analytical examples, this time co-written with
Michel Callon. In writing about the strategies and actions of the Renault
enterprise in developing their electric car, the authors at one point state (quite
matter-of-factly) that ‘Renault wants to remain autonomous and indivisible,
itself deciding what will be the social and technical future of the industrial
world’ (Callon and Latour, 1981: 290). Evidently, this quotation performs one
of the oldest tricks of the sociology of the social: it connects (in a quite ‘jumpy’
way!) the economically constrained black-box of Renault with its response
(action) to various outside pressures (commercial, political, technical, moral).
This amounts to a common sense explanation, since an element of description
is supplied with what appears to be ‘reasonable’ and ‘self-evident’ interpreta-
tion, this time relying on what we might call a ‘generalized Machiavellianism’
of power-maximizing and strategy-oriented action. However, again stating
what is rather obvious: this interpretation is opposed by much available
literature (theoretical and empirical) on the subject of why and how compa-
nies act the way they do.12 An interpretative choice is being made, but it is not
set out explicitly as a choice, only presented as something resembling fact.
Latour, we should stress, does occasionally acknowledge this point about
the inevitability of theoretical interpretation, for instance when talking about
the uncertainties and responsibilities of social scientific work (Latour, 2005:
127f). Still, he seems to consider it a banal point, not worthy of much attention
(see Latour, 1988b). As we have tried to show with this small example,
however, problems might run deeper than Latour wants to acknowledge: at
stake is the inability to methodologically stratify the treatment of different
levels of uncertainty in dealing with empirical observations; and hence ulti-
mately of specifying what makes for a good description (see Savage, 2009).
These limitations in methodological self-reflection become crucial, we believe,
in the context of Latour’s widened field of theoretical application of ANT into
all of sociality, particular given his tendency to ‘heterogenize’ the folds of
human actants. In the following section, we attempt to rectify the imbalance by
way of the concept of quasi-actants. Put briefly, we want to argue that the social
world cannot be completely reduced to its genealogy of concrete associa-
tions (at least not by the sociologist trying to reconstruct it), and that ‘respon-
sible description’ thus requires a modified set of concepts from those of
Latour’s vocabulary. Again, however, it is important to stress that ours is a
reconstruction, not a deconstruction, of Latourian ANT.
4. Quasi-actants: empirical difficulty versus obscurity
When dealing with a complex social phenomenon such as moral convictions,
one analytical option – which Latour draws attention to in Morality and
Technology (2002) – will be to reduce the phenomenon in question to its
specific genealogy of relations (folds and work). This, however, seems only a
theoretical option: in social practice, moral obligations amongst human actants
are likely to foster a bewildering array of open-endedness, obscurity, and
controversy. Further, reducing a phenomenon like morality to its specific
genealogy would be to miss the crucial role that moral convictions come to
play in social life, by becoming ‘self-referential’ in their performance and
reproduction. As soon as moral convictions are constructed in the minds and
languages of human actants (including all the material folds this implies),
one way of ‘putting it to use’ is to simply refer to it, in social interaction, as
something valid or even universal. The same is true for collective representa-
tions such as ‘British society’, ‘democracy’, ‘youth culture’, and so on – in short,
a great deal of the vocabulary of the sociology of the social so vehemently
denied by Latour. All of these complex symbolic compounds have the poten-
tial to become what we will refer to as quasi-actants. The following exposition
is meant to elaborate this concept, drawing on various intellectual resources all
in the vicinity of Latour’s own work – and hence to position the concept clearly
in relation to his descriptivist methodology.
At various points, Latour comes close to acknowledging the phenomenon
of quasi-actants. For instance, in We Have Never Been Modern (1993: 117),
Latour refers to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (2004a) through the
notion of ‘territories’, which he contrasts to that of his own ‘networks’ (1993:
117). In Latour’s paraphrase, the term territoriality becomes an inclusive
allegory for all the invisible ‘ethers’ of ‘society’, all of the ‘hidden social
structures’ that are to be conceptually dissolved into a network ontology.
Deleuze and Guattari themselves, however, entertain a slightly different
take on territoriality. A major point of their critical work is to show that, even
though social territories (in the widest sense) may have no ‘essential’
or ‘transcendent’ existence, they nevertheless exercise considerable social
power, since we are liable to constantly employ them socially. This is what
Anti-Oedipus suggests: even though the Oedipus complex may be a fallacy
– a neurosis disciplining the ‘schizophrenic’ nature of humans – it has
come to encrypt us in Freudian triangles of mother, father, and child. Since,
as Deleuze and Guattari notes (2004a: 76), ‘we are forcibly confronted with
Oedipus and castration’, as analysts and social actors we need to confront this
territorializing entity, living its own life in our heads, in psychology textbooks,
and on the couches of psychoanalysts. In the language of A Thousand
Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 11): movements of de- and re-
territorialization are inextricably caught up in one another, and need to be
analyzed as such.
Latour, however, shows rather little regard for analyzing the re-
territorializing performances of specific social events. While he is right in
noting that the social is not organized in ‘societies’, if we nevertheless employ
society’s various languages and ‘enact’ it as such, it will come to play a quasi-
independent role (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 101). Interestingly, what
Deleuze and Guattari are pointing to here is close to the famous ‘Thomas
theorem’ in classic symbolic interactionist sociology: ‘if men define situations
as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas, 1928:
572). As a present-day heir to both Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and
American pragmatism (see Latour, 2004b), Latour really should have no
objections against this fundamentally ‘performative’ dictum. Even so, he
has characteristically little to say about the meaning and consequences of
social-symbolic ‘territorial’ performances (like ‘society’ and ‘moral convic-
tions’) in networking human actants. This is exactly the asymmetry we are
pointing to, and trying to correct, through the concept of quasi-actants.
If actors keep ‘defending’ the territories, the structures, the social, the
cultural, and so on – of what significance is it, then, that they ‘are not there’,
according to Latour, if we still employ them, manage them, and thereby turn
them into quasi-actants? The situation is parallel to that of Nietzsche, who
famously proclaimed that ‘God is dead’. Deleuze and Guattari reminds us that
this point of Nietzsche does not entail that God will no longer play any role:
‘what takes so long in coming to consciousness is the news that the death of
God makes no difference to the unconscious’ (2004a: 117; italics in original).
To paraphrase on one of Latour’s better-known claims (1993), and contra his
own interpretation: ‘that we realize that the world has never been modern
may not make much difference to our modernity’. Latour’s argument for
leaving ‘territoriality’ (in the broad sense) behind in sociology must therefore,
somehow, rest on the assumption that these powerful symbolic effects not only
‘do not exist’ – but that they do not exist at all. In other words, that they are not
(or, no longer) employed and performed, once we have unfolded their gene-
alogy of associations, showing that God, the Moral Imperatives, Oedipus, and
so on, where never really prime essences of the social.
This, however, seems highly implausible. Arguably, it runs counter to the
idea of genealogy as a question of power-inflicted historical constructions of
subjectivities, rather than any search for ‘origins’ (see Foucault, 1984). Closer
still to the phenomenon of moral convictions, Nietzsche (1997: 23) observed
the following as to the socially ‘hereditary’ properties of such entities: ‘when
the habit of some [morally] distinguishing action is inherited, the thought that
lies behind it is not inherited with it’ (1997: 23). What is interesting to note is
that, according to this line of reasoning, the work of producing moral distinc-
tions is ‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ in its transmissions (if it was ever perceived in the
first place), but moral habits as such are not. We ourselves, as Deleuze and
Guattari suggest, ‘summon’ moral convictions, and with them other social
‘territories’, but these constructions from then on come to play a performative
and self-referential role in social life. In other words, the fact that moral
convictions are not ‘transcendental’ does not imply that they do not exist at all
– that bodies, symbolic language and so on, does not perceive and reproduce
this obscure ‘social unconscious’. This is what we want to convey through the
notion of the quasi-actant.
Just like a premonition of Latour, Nietzsche (1999) proclaims that ‘morality
is constructed’, fabricated in stinking workshops! But contrary to Latour,
Nietzsche’s intervention is meant to highlight how, at the same time, moral
codes are awarded genuineness by human actants – they neglect its genealogy,
thus providing it with a life, a (quasi-)actant-ship, that lies beyond the material-
semiotic construction of it.13 It is important to realize why raising these
Nietszchean-Deleuzian (and symbolic interactionist) points in connection
with Latour does not lead back to Durkheimian sociology of the social, but on
the contrary attempts to smooth out Latour’s own asymmetry: society, moral
convictions, group identities are not simply ‘out there’ – they are ‘worked-out-
there’ by subject-object hybrids. Thus, while we indeed aim to level out some
of Latour’s inter-objectivist biases, we would still agree to his ontological point
about the fundamental inseparability of minds, bodies, and symbols (and their
quasi-subjects) from the material world (and its quasi-objects). However, it
should also be clear why the work of quasi-actants is fundamentally distinct
from the ‘materialist’ work on which Latour bases his second empiricism: the
Latourian dictum to ‘just go on describing’ is in need of re-specification,
because quasi-actants, such as moral folds, are fundamentally obscure – not just
difficult to uncover.
Having stated this, it is symmetrically important to emphasize that the term
quasi-actant is not just a metaphysical category, or for that matter a black-box
for unexplainable empirical observations; on the contrary, the performative
existence of quasi-actants can be demonstrated empirically without much
trouble. Religious zeal, ‘war on terror’, neo-liberal ideologies, ethnic identities,
moral-legal commandments (such as ‘do not steal’), and so on, these are all
partly quasi-actants – something that acts in social life with primary reference
to itself. These quasi-actants obviously also form part of networks, just like
a hammer. Quasi-actants such as moral-legal commandments, however, do
not call attention to themselves simply as constructions – if that was the case,
there would be no point in criticizing Latour – but rather as semiotic-
material elements that, from here on, act as if they were ‘transcendental’,
thus by reference to themselves in their performative impact on the social
world (see Bertilsson, 2008). Simply put, these are the bases on which we
interpret situations and judge other people’s actions, enabling us to go on in
social life. But these quasi-actants have no easily identifiable ‘social form’:
unlike hammers or indeed human individuals, they exist only in and through
continuous and collective employment.
Although quasi-actants will often embed human-centric concerns, however,
this in itself does not lead into any reintroduction of Great Divides between
subjects and objects. Quasi-actants, we note, are folded into things – and not
only guns, No-Smoking signs, and speed bumps, but also constitutions, police
forces, economic markets, and so on. All of these symbolic-material relations
are amenable to description, Latourian style; what cannot be fully described,
however, are the exact interpretive steps by which quasi-actants come to do
particular work in specific social situations.
4.1. Notes on black boxes versus quasi-actants
As already noted, the concept of quasi-actant is meant as a supplement
to Latour’s notion of a black-box. Hence, at this stage, it is fitting to compare
the two concepts – which, superficially, might resemble each other – in a
direct way. By black-boxes, Latour (and Callon) refers to a set of stabilized
relations; more specifically, in ANT language, ‘an actor grows with the number
of relations he or she can put into black boxes’ (Callon and Latour, 1981: 284f).
Can ‘society’, we may ask, be said to be a ‘black box’ in this sense? Evidently,
this would only be as an umbrella term covering a network of actants in
concrete relations – hence the dictum that ‘society explains nothing but must
itself be explained’. But to actants somehow enrolled, in a network sense, into
‘societies’ through beliefs, practices, and socio-material relations, society
enjoys a form of ‘quasi-existence’ – society quasi-acts on them as something
they relate to. Indeed, as shorthands for relatively stable bundles of associa-
tions, Latour acknowledges the social existence of collective representations
such as ‘IBM’, ‘France’, and ‘lower-middle class’ (see Latour, 2005: 11).
However, contrary to these Latourian black-box examples – large-scale cor-
porations, nation-states, social classes – the concept of quasi-actant is meant, in
a positive sense, to encompass those very entities of collective social ‘ether’
renounced by his sociology: societies, moralities, identities, subjectivities.
Further, compared to the mechanistic metaphor of the black-box, employ-
ing the concept of quasi-actant is, we believe, more conceptually appropriate
in most standard social science settings, including those of companies
and nations, where the very actant-ship of these intangible entities is at
stake.
In particular, the concept of quasi-actant allows us to escape the dichoto-
mous ‘swing’ between actants and black-boxes in Latour’s semiotics-inspired
social ontology. To illustrate this point, let us take up again the example of
Latour and Callon (1981): Renault, in their view, is fundamentally still just a
comprehensive network of concrete relations – shorter or longer, more or less
stabile, more or less extended. The entire impetus of ANT would be to ‘re-
open’ this black-box and examine its constitutive relations. Against this back-
drop of Latourian social ontology, while ‘Renault’ is certainly a black-box,
deciding whether it is also and simultaneously an actant seems to be a some-
what arbitrary analytical procedure. On the one hand, as a black-boxed macro-
entity, ANT highlights how ‘Renault’ is fundamentally a conglomerate of
factories, employees, contracts, company cars, and so on. Nevertheless, as
already noted, Latour and Callon seem to have no problem imputing (rather
common-sense-like) actant-ship on this hybrid conglomerate, endowing it
with quasi-intentions. This seems to us an unsatisfactory solution to classic
issues of ‘methodological individualism’, based on an unresolved tension
between semiotics and theoretical nominalism in Latour’s writings. Funda-
mentally, it seems, at the level of social ontology, Latour-the-nominalist wants
us to realize that ‘Renault’ is not a ‘real’ actant, but rather shorthand for
an extensive black-boxed network. Actors may use ‘Renault’ as a semiotic
actant in their speech-acts, but Latour-the-analyst must re-translate it into a
black-box.
Contra this procedure, we emphasize how the concept of quasi-actants
allows us to immediately grasp the way in which symbolic-material entities
like Renault are invoked and employed variably in social life, often with great
consequences. To give a simple example: on the stock exchange, exactly what
part(s) of ‘Renault’ will ‘make a difference’ in actor’s economic calculations is
obscure in empirical terms, enfolded as it is in an environment of rapid infor-
mation turnover, rumours, and advanced mathematical modelling (see Knorr-
Cetina and Brügger, 2002).14 Here, talking about Renault as a quasi-actant
seems much more adequate than the black-box metaphor. In other words,
it is exactly Renault-as-symbolically-enacted – that is, as quasi-actant – which
investors and financial speculators on the stock exchange refer to in their work
and talk. So, indeed, Renault can be dissolved (by Latour) into contracts,
employees etc., thus displaying its constitutive relations. But when someone,
sometimes, to some extend, consciously or unconsciously, invokes Renault-as-
one-actant, such a Latourian analysis would, by its nature, leave out important
empirical realities.
By way of summing up, the methodological problem with Latourian
descriptivism can thus be put more pointedly: he has left out a certain category
of folds – those supported by the symbolic and performative powers of human
actants – which are distinct from purely ‘material’ folds in terms of their social
effects. The difference between black-boxes and quasi-actants lies, first, in the
constitutively obscure origins of the latter, and second, in the putting to use of
imaginary-symbolic objects, such as the external ‘coming-into-being’ of moral
convictions, group identities, and so on. In short, folded subjectivities produce
quasi-actants, to which Latour pays little attention. If one accepts this argu-
ment, it then becomes much harder to defend a pure common sense descrip-
tivist position, since the influence of our experiences, of other actants’ work on
us, on later ‘choices’ (‘moral’ folds) constitute a different order of uncertainty
and obscurity from that of things folding morality (‘material’ folds). Again,
this argument does not entail any privileging of imaginary-symbolic actants in
the explanatory efforts of social scientists – we are not regressing into some
version of ‘social constructivism’. Rather, in parallel to what Latour has
already done for non-humans, turning them from matters-of-fact to matters-
of-concern, our concept of quasi-actant simply performs a similar operation at
the level of human actors.
We are now also in a position to briefly revisit Latour’s before-mentioned
attempts to ‘heterogenize’ humans into a circulation of subjectifiers (or ‘plug-
ins’) (Latour, 2005: 207ff). True to his black-box line of reasoning, these con-
cepts helpfully point to the concrete, material folds and work producing
different kinds of ‘generic’ personalities, be it ‘homo economicus’ in economics
textbooks, ‘users of dishwashers’ in technological guidelines, and so on. By
using the language of subjectifiers, Latour is attempting to avoid another
Great Divide, this time between psychology and sociology, the divide between
intrinsic (person) and extrinsic (society). However, since – as we have argued
– the empirical ‘gap’ of action execution is always constitutively obscure
(rather than simply difficult to describe), too often Latour is forced to retreat
into another one of his methodological dictums: ‘if it leaves no visible trace,
leave it blank’. To counter the limitations of this empiricist agnosticism, our
concept of quasi-actant is designed, instead, to allow certain obscure forms of
social-symbolic ‘objectifiers’ – like moral concerns, identities, desires – to
(re-)gain an explicit role in empirical inquiry, without fundamentally breaking
with ANT social ontology.
A similar kind of argument can be made in relation to Latour’s notion of
‘panorama’, set forth in Reassembling the Social (2005: 183ff) as a conceptual
ANT innovation, denoting the way actors contextualize each other by sym-
bolically invoking social wholes, such as ‘globalization’, in specific speech-acts.
Like other aspects of the social territory, Latour stresses, panoramas should
be documented in the specific: who is doing the projecting, by what media,
towards which audience, and so on.This, we believe, is valuable and suggestive;
however, it once again leaves unspecified just how the social analyst is sup-
posed to fully describe the process whereby, as Latour notes (2005: 189),
panoramas end up equipping actors with ‘a desire for wholeness and central-
ity’. The continuous and collective enactment of such ‘desires’ for social
meaning-wholes – whether moral convictions, group identities, or grand nar-
ratives of modernity – is simply not fully describable, since their social effects
extend beyond their visible presence. In short, if we want to know what
panoramas do as quasi-actants in social life, some level of interpretation is
called for.15
The important point, in sum, is that whereas Latour’s use of common sense
description might have been acceptable when confined to studies of techno-
science, it emerges as insufficiently attentive to quasi-actants at the moment
when ANT is extended into the entire field of sociology. This line of criticism,
evidently, serves to re-open questions of the proper use of theory in socio-
logical inquiry, given that forms of interpretation (either common sense or
theoretical) will inevitably influence the way social life is ‘unfolded’. Space
prevents us from pursuing this question fully; however, by way of drawing
this article to its conclusion, we want to suggest what seems to us a promising
way of ‘hybridising’ Latourian empiricism with theoretical work, in what we
call virtual theory. In taking up this discussion, we again aim to stay true to
fundamental tenets of ANT, this time related to the advantages of common
sense description: that it stays attentive to the multifaceted folding of situated
social actants.The question, of course, is how such empiricist attentiveness can
be combined with a view to the obscurity of quasi-actants – a question, which
seems to us to point beyond Latourian empiricism and into wider issues of
contemporary sociological method.
5. Concluding reflections: re-folding theory into ANT empiricism?
In this article, we have explored ways in which Bruno Latour’s newly
formulated and comprehensive sociological programme – dubbed ‘sociology
of associations’ (2005) – poses serious challenges of a meta-theoretical and
methodological character. Setting forth his ANT agenda of redistributing our
notions of ‘objectivity’ primarily within studies of science and technology,
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Latour has shown comparatively little regard to the symmetrical processes
through which ‘subjectivity’ works in ‘objectifying’ itself into various perfor-
mances of socio-material reality. In short, while attempting to maintain a
generalized symmetry between human and non-human actants, more often
than not, Latour seems in practice to be ‘heterogenizing’ human subjectivities
onto a background of materially stabilized, and technologically shaped, assem-
blages. This is nowhere more apparent than in Latour’s analyses of how moral
convictions are folded into material things like hammers and guns; here, his
analyses leaves us short of understanding, let alone describing, how bodies,
symbols, and subjective desires simultaneously contribute to the process of
forging socio-technical effects.
While sympathetic to Latour’s overall call for a sociology of associations –
arguably one of the most exciting attempts in recent years of renewing the
sociological enterprise from scratch – we take issue with his problematic
reliance on common sense interpretation, embedded in the dictum to ‘just go
on describing’. Instead, we call attention to the irreplaceable role of empirical
obscurity, encountered when describing ephemeral social phenomena such
as moral codes, group identities, and desires that constitutively ‘erase their
traces’ while acting on the social. We dub this phenomenon ‘quasi-actants’,
showing how Latour’s (second) empiricism fails to deal adequately with it,
and how it might nonetheless be re-integrated into ANT. Here, the concept
of quasi-actant works to supplement notions of black-boxes and panoramas.
As pointed out, such a conceptual reconstruction of ANT symmetry simulta-
neously entails a rethinking of the description-explanation-interpretation
conundrum, in particular creating space for more ‘positive’ contributions
from particular forms of theory in the empiricist sociology envisaged by
Latour.
On this concluding note, we believe our argument on Latour, empiricism,
and quasi-actants carry more general consequences for on-going method-
ological debates in sociology, particularly in terms of how his promising
notion of ‘negative theory’ might be made productive for sociological
inquiry. Here, we agree with Latour’s injunction that, if left unchecked, ‘posi-
tive’ social theory easily develops into a highly problematic way of silencing
the voices of empirical actants (see Latour, 2005: 220ff). In an important
analogy, Latour compares the discipline of sociology to that of topology,
with the aim being to follow the actants through ‘hills and valleys’, instead
of jumping between theoretical ‘levels’ such as those of actors (micro) and
structures (macro), as portrayed in ‘standard’ social theory (Latour, 1983:
153ff). Taking this concern seriously, we nevertheless maintain that certain
forms of theoretical interpretations are called for, when confronted with the
empirical obscurities of quasi-actants. Hence, we want to suggest that one
way of fruitfully re-folding sociological theory into ANT ontology is to
think in terms of virtual theory. We end with some thoughts on this recon-
structed ANT, and how it enables a more general recasting of core issues in
sociological method.
With virtual theory, we follow Fraser (2006; 2009) in her sociological
appropriation of this Deleuzian term, understood broadly as that dimension
of the actual which is not directly observable – and which hence requires
some work of conceptual abstraction.16 The function of virtual theory would
thus be to provide just enough conceptual mobility for the sociologist to ‘go
on describing’, in the face of inerasable empirical obscurity in the social
landscape. Rather than relying on common sense interpretation, and instead
of the Latourian dictum to ‘leave it blank’ (that is, denying the problem),
such a notion of theory implies an attempt to deal in explicit and reflected
ways with the radical uncertainties implied by any description of social
reality. By contrast to typological approaches to social theory – which seek
to define general social essences and their causal connections – virtual
theory entails an analytical commitment to remain sensitive to the dynamic,
non-causal, and intensive patterns of relational social life (see DeLanda,
2002). At the same time, however, it also entails a commitment to move
‘beyond’ actual-states-of-affairs, by attending to the creative work involved
in making connections between different levels of abstraction (Fraser, 2009).
This ‘beyond’ is constituted by conceptual categories of what could be:
both at ontological and immediate empirical levels, conceptual distinc-
tions institute a crucial ‘counterfactual’ space for on-going work of
re-interpretation in the social sciences.
Common sense and theory, on this account, are two degrees of the same
process of inquiry: theory is common sense with a higher degree of explication
and reflexivity about counterfactuals (see Abbott, 2004). Hence, virtual theory
constitutes an opening for dealing with the difficulties accompanying obscure
quasi-actants, such as those highlighted in this article: moral convictions, group
identities, desires, and other imaginary-symbolic social performances. Taking
the sophisticated analytical frame developed by Latour as conceptual baseline,
the question for virtual theory in any piece of inquiry should thus be: what
further conceptual work is required in order to make sense of this specific
quasi-actant? (see Holbraad, 2004). Theory, here, is explicitly co-developed
with empirical descriptions. In this sense, we are simply adding a positive value
to the negative theory posited by Latour: in virtual shape, theory is a reflected
way of dealing with the necessary choices entailed in giving any ‘account’ of
the social world – and thereby of ‘responsible’ accounting as such (Fraser,
2006). In other words, when invoking theory, the ideal should be to explicate
the grid of uncertain possibilities – not to act as a synthetic surrogate for
silencing the multiplicity of empirical voices.
In practice, Latour’s work acknowledges this point; at the level of meta-
theory, however, he is limited by a strict version of descriptivism.This seems all
the more curious when considering the fact that, among the few sociologists
referenced positively by Latour, French neo-pragmatists Luc Boltanski and
Laurent Thévenot can be said to exemplify exactly the notion of virtual theory
set out here. In their work on the sociology of moral life (1991), Boltanski
and Thévenot incorporate explicit elements of theoretical interpretation,
developed through a reading of classical philosophies of the common good, in
combination with detailed inquiries into everyday instances of social conflict,
justification and critique. In developing their ‘justificatory regimes’, Boltanski
and Thévenot are not claiming these as latent ‘causal structures’, an underlying
reality revealed by omnipotent sociologists. Indeed, their six regimes have no
actual empirical existence, in the same sense that ‘society’ has no actual empiri-
cal existence. Instead, as analytical categories formatted by social scientists out
of more-or-less coherent everyday grammars, what these ‘virtual’ regimes do is
to artificially enhance empirical similarities and differences, reveal regularities
across sites, explicate interpretations and possibilities, and assist in further
social science reflection.
In short, the conceptual work of Boltanski and Thévenot – like creative and
empirically sensitive conceptual work before them in sociology – function
much like Latourian ‘inscription devices’ in furthering social science inquiry.
Only they do so by encompassing high levels of conceptual abstraction, in
making connections not only between formal political philosophy and every-
day moral reasoning, but by explicating their own interpretive relation to
those epistemic traditions that have shaped the moral objects under study (see
Brown, 2010). In general terms, when treated as contingent quasi-actants,
theoretical concepts serve to protect us from unfortunate intellectual folding-
habits: like models, virtual theory institutionalizes a space for reflection on the
‘coding’ of empirical sense-data. Pure habit, after all, would rather work as
a non-substantiated maintenance of taken-for-granted categories. In the
final analysis, our notion of virtual theory thus corresponds to the meta-
methodological argument sketched out in the beginning of this article:
Latour’s distinction between description and explanation is itself artificial,
denying their necessary hybridisation.
We hope now to have shown how a simultaneous introduction of quasi-
actants and virtual theory into an ANT social ontology leads us away from
Latour’s own empiricism, and towards something we might call a ‘new inter-
pretive descriptivism’. Here, quasi-actants introduce a fundamental uncer-
tainty in any sociological description: one now has to explicitly choose to
interpret the work of actants as either an employment of quasi-actants or as
‘independent’ mediation. Since this is a choice of interpretation, it can always
be questioned in subsequent rounds of enfolding – and, contrary to the
employment of black-boxes and panoramas in standard ANT, this choice is
now forced out into the open. Virtual theory cannot tell us ‘what we are
looking for’, but it can structure the evaluation of possibilities and uncertain-
ties: ‘what actually happened here?’ is the meta-question that renders our
reconstructed sociology of associations accountable. With quasi-actants and
virtual theory, in short, we are not regressing into sociology of the social, but
elaborating a more symmetrical symmetry than the one advocated by the
sociological empiricism of Bruno Latour. This is why our criticism is strictly
immanent: Latourian sociology of associations remains the most promising
candidate in contemporary sociology for seriously addressing the core
problem of empirical obscurity, once it comes to methodological terms with its
own Nietzschean, Deleuzian, and symbolic-interactionist legacies.
Notes
1 It is important to stress that ANT is a collective endeavour, encompassing – alongside Latour
– the work of Michel Callon, John Law, and others. For the purpose of this article, we focus
strictly on the version of ANT presented by Latour in Reassembling the Social (2005), as
embodying his sociology of associations. Arguably, Latour’s take on sociological methodology
is subtly distinct from that of ANT co-founder John Law (eg 2002); however, exploring these
relations is beyond the scope of this article.
2 The Leibnizian-Deleuzian lineage (or folding) of this term is not important here, since Latour
develops the concept in his own idiosyncratic way. Latour refers to Deleuze’s book on Leibniz,
simply called The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993), adding that his usage of the concept
of fold is ‘less Leibnizian than Deleuze’s’ (Latour, 2002: 248).
3 ‘Being’ and ‘becoming’ are heavily loaded philosophical terms, but here we simply employ
them as illustrations of Latour’s way of dealing with subjects and objects. Latour’s own
primary reference in this regards is Whitehead, and his processual ontology of events. See, eg,
Latour, 1999: 152f. For a discussion of this philosophical lineage in Latour’s work, see Fraser,
2006.
4 Characteristically, in the one article where Latour does take up the question of human folds
directly, in speaking about the body (2004a), what interest him are the technological devices
through which bodies learn to be affected (by things like smells). We return to Latour’s
concept of ‘circulation of subjectifiers’ in section 4.1.
5 In the next section, we dig deeper into Latour’s problematic alliance with common sense
explanations.
6 By ‘hearts and brains’ we are simply alluding to the work of bodies in mediating moral
convictions, along lines suggested casually by Latour himself. We do not want to suggest that
such convictions are essentially in or of these body-organs; like other quasi-actants, moral
convictions are heterogeneous phenomena, constituted both bodily, symbolically, and materi-
ally. This will become clearer as the article proceeds.
7 ‘Inscription device’ is one of the oldest terms of ANT, stemming from Latour’s anthropology
of science (eg Latour and Woolgar, 1979), and connoting the many (mostly technical) devices
through which experimental matter (rats, chemical substances) are translated into notes, texts,
or graphs.
8 Latour’s (2005) criticism of existing sociological theory is all the more scathing, because it
relates to his more general critiques of the ‘Modern Constitution’ and its Great Divides
between Society and Nature (1993). Surprisingly, whereas his fellow ANT co-authors Michel
Callon (economics) and John Law (sociology) have both taken up the topic of the performa-
tive impacts of social scientific work, Latour himself has written relatively little on this issue
(but see Latour, 2004b). On our part, the example should not be perceived as an appeal for
abandoning the use of statistics in sociology.
9 In the actor-network literature, a number of conceptual alternatives to networks have arisen
over the years: Michel Callon (2005), for instance, now speaks of ‘agencements’ as collectives
of human beings, institutions, technical devices, and so on, with specific heterogeneous actors
taking their shape from such collective assemblages. Latour himself has suggested speaking of
‘work-nets’ rather than networks, to capture this sense of dynamic co-agencies. While impor-
tant, however, these conceptual refinements are not crucial for us in establishing our point
about quasi-actants.
10 While we refer to Collins and Yearley on this specific point, our general questioning of
Latour’s methodology bears only superficial resemblance to that expressed in the so-called
‘epistemological chicken’ debate (see also Callon and Latour, 1992).
11 Indeed, in his work on the Politics of Nature (2004b: 242), Latour is careful to restore the
notion of common sense to epistemological glory: ‘whereas it may be permissible to force good
sense somewhat with venturesome arguments, it is always necessary to verify that one is finally
rejoining common sense’.
12 So, depending on theoretical paradigm, other analysts might focus on how the employees of
Renault identify socially with the company as a meaningful entity; how Renault as an orga-
nization is committed to values of techno-scientific progress and environmental protection; etc.
etc.
13 Throughout his work on moral convictions, Nietzsche of course talks mainly of Christianity,
with its chaste nuns and church fathers depicted – we might say – as an extended network of
psychological resentment (see Nietzsche, 1997; 1999). Given that Latour has recently written
extensively on Catholic faith, this provides an interesting area for exploring the limitations of
his ‘anti-transcendental’ descriptivist approach (see Holbraad, 2004), clearly contrasting to
that of Nietzsche. For a more systematic analysis of the Nietzschean legacy in Latour’s work,
see Bruun Jensen and Selinger, 2003.
14 One only has to think of the ongoing financial crisis to grasp some of the ‘prodigious effects’
produced by the obscurity of quasi-actants – in this case, the circulation of expected, that is,
virtual profit.
15 Latour, on his part, primarily invests his panoramas with political effects: the task of gradually
composing collective life. While space prevents us from pursuing this point, compared to our
notion of quasi-actants, this seems to us a prematurely limited role.
16 In Reassembling the Social (2005: 59), Latour at one point (in a footnote) relate his own
concept of mediators to this Deleuzian terminology: concatenations of mediators, he suggests,
‘actualize virtualities’. Tellingly, however, Latour at no point specifies what this notion of
virtualities implies in terms of his own methodological vocabulary. For more on the relation
between Latour, Deleuze and the virtual, see Fraser, 2006.
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